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‘Are people in poverty more or less like you and me but
with less money?’ There is a sense in which the correct
answer to this question is ‘Yes’. People in poverty have
not dropped in from Venus or Mars; they are not an
altogether different species to people who are not in
poverty. In all probability, measured by studies
distinguishing between chronic and transient poverty,
some of those who are not currently in poverty will fall
into poverty at some stage in their lives.
However, as a description of what being in poverty is,
or of the reasons why people fall into poverty, the
correct answer must be an unqualified ‘No’. In most
cases, and especially in developing countries, being in
poverty describes a range of deficits or deprivations,
including insufficient consumption, lack of access to
basic services, limited opportunities for economic
activity, political disenfranchisement, and gender or
age discrimination, to name but a few. In many cases,
being in poverty persists for considerable periods of
time, even across lifetimes and generations.
There is growing recognition that poverty is
multidimensional and can persist in time, and that, as
a consequence, anti-poverty policy must address the
range of deficits that draw households into poverty
and can keep them there. This is apparent from a
large and growing literature and practice on
emerging new forms of social assistance in
developing countries, including categorical income
transfers, conditional and unconditional income
transfers, reformed social safety net programmes and
poverty reduction strategies. It is tremendously
encouraging that this understanding of poverty is
having a direct influence on policy, in the design and
implementation of integrated anti-poverty
programmes. These combine a range of
interventions, such as the conditional cash transfer
programmes in Latin America, which link income
transfers to support consumption with health,
schooling and nutrition interventions, or the
integrated programmes directed at the extreme
poor such as Chile’s Chile Solidario, or Bangladesh’s
Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting
the Ultra-poor Programme.
A common factor in these anti-poverty programmes is
the use of cash or income transfers, as an essential
element. They provide a regular and reliable injection
of purchasing power, enabling the kind of investment
in nutrition, healthcare and schooling which could lead
to a sustained escape from poverty in the long term.
They are not, however, the sole element in the
programme. Linkages to basic services, as in the case
of the Latin American programme mentioned above,
or income-generating activities, as in the Bangladesh
programme, are significant elements. These linkages
to other key interventions expand as the programmes
develop, as has been the experience of Mexico’s
Oportunidades. The quality of these linkages varies from
programme to programme. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and
Mexico’s Oportunidades, for example, include a
conditionality that children of school-going age attend
school regularly, but rely on the relevant Ministry to
ensure that school places are available. Coordination at
the local level is important. Other conditional cash
transfer programmes, such as Honduras’ PRAF II and
Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social have similar
conditionalities but include direct transfers to schools
to support additional places for programme
beneficiaries.
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It is important to note, before conditionalities are
discussed, that there are many other features of
income transfer programmes that are covered in the
literature, including whether the programmes reach
those in poverty and those in greatest poverty;
whether the forms of assistance provided are
effective and adequate to ensure a significant
reduction in poverty; whether the programmes are
likely to strengthen, or help establish, broader social
protection systems; whether the programmes
support the emergence of a ‘social contract’ to
underpin social protection; and issues of financial and
implementation capacity. There is also the
importance of context in arriving at conclusions on
these issues that are capable of informing policy.
It would be hard to make a case that the issue of
conditionality can compete in significance with those
listed above. However, understanding the role of
conditionalities in income transfer programmes
addressing poverty could help to clarify this.
There are different rationales for the inclusion of
conditionalities in income transfer programmes. First,
conditionalities could be included to achieve
programme objectives. Work requirements for
income transfers, as in public works programmes, are
commonly introduced to facilitate the objective of
reaching those unable to secure employment.
Requiring beneficiaries to supply a certain amount of
work, and setting the benefit at a level below the
local market wage, excludes those who could secure
employment outside the programme. Where
conditional cash transfer programmes are aimed at
securing household investment in schooling or
healthcare, the transfer could be made conditional
on children attending school on a regular basis, or on
regular access to primary healthcare. Conditionalities
help to ensure these programme objectives.
Second, conditionalities may reflect the concerns of
tax-payers that potential beneficiaries take full
advantage of the transfers. Alternative explanations
for the tax-payers’ concerns are possible: paternalistic
tax-payers may wish to impose on beneficiaries the
values and priorities they themselves hold; prudent
tax-payers may be concerned to ensure that
beneficiaries exit poverty thereby limiting future
liabilities; self-interested tax-payers may be keen to
prevent behaviour with adverse effects for
themselves – for example requiring children to be at
school means they will not be loitering in the streets.
Third, conditionalities may be included to facilitate
political support for the income transfer programmes
by signalling a commitment to deliver on its
objectives. It is also possible for conditionalities to
respond to a combination of the above.
In Latin America, the primary factor behind the
adoption of conditionalities has been the need to
achieve the programme objectives of ensuring
household investment in human capital. These are
deemed essential to help break the intergenerational
cycle of poverty. Research has indicated that schooling
and healthcare utilisation are deficient for many of
those in poverty, and especially those in extreme
poverty, even where these services are available. This is
because people in poverty face high costs, relative to
their resources, of accessing these services, and
because of exclusion. Income transfers are intended to
help remove the cost barrier, while programme
linkages to service providers are expected to help
lower exclusion. Conditionalities that are meant to
ensure household investment in schooling and
healthcare can also ensure a measure of coordination
between programme managers and service providers.
This is the theory; practice is another thing altogether.
Some argue that conditionalities are unnecessary, in
that programme objectives could be achieved without
them. Others criticise the use of conditionalities in
income transfer programmes in certain circumstances.
There is sense and no-sense in both these views.
Some argue that conditionalities relating to health
and education are unnecessary because people in
poverty would have sent their children to school, or
made use of primary healthcare, in the absence of
conditionalities. But it is important to pay attention to
the marginal beneficiaries. In rural Mexico, dropout
rates at the start of secondary school, especially for
girls, were unacceptably high. Estimates of the impact
of Oportunidades on enrolment rates suggest that two
years after the start of the programme, these had
increased by around 1 percentage point (from a base
of 90–94 per cent) for boys in primary school and as
much as 9.3 percentage points (from a base of 67 per
cent) for girls in secondary school. The impact of the
conditionality is measured by the marginal households
that enrolled their children, or did not withdraw
them as they would otherwise have done. Whether
this is worth the 2 per cent of transfer costs absorbed
by implementing conditionalities in Oportunidades is a
separate issue (Caldès et al. 2004).
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Some argue that conditionalities are unnecessary
because unconditional transfers also show a positive
impact on enrolment rates, for example the social
pension in South Africa. This is fine up to a point. We
need to know more about the size of these effects,
and why they appear to be gendered, that is why
girls’ enrolments rise with female pensioners, but
boys’ enrolments do not (Duflo 2003). Estimates of
the impact of income transfers are hard to identify
with precision because of the absence of
counterfactuals, i.e. what would have happened if
the programme had not been there. There are few
valid counterfactuals to identify the impact of
conditionalities, but it would be hard to argue that
they are either never, or always, necessary.
Some argue that conditionalities will not work under
certain conditions, and this is true as far as it goes.
Schooling conditionalities are unlikely to work where
it is not possible to expand school places, but if the
objective of the programme is to increase enrolments
and school attendance, then unconditional income
transfers will not work either. The issue here is to
combine income transfers with improvements in
school infrastructure, independently of whether
transfers are conditional or unconditional. Similar
arguments apply to health services.
The main problem with introducing conditionalities
in income transfers arises when these impose
compliance costs on those in poverty. These include
time spent by mothers ensuring that conditions are
met, filling forms, and queuing at schools or clinics.
To the extent that these are non-trivial and are not
accounted for in setting the level of the transfer,
they are likely to compound the adverse situation of
those in poverty. Conditional income transfer
programmes seldom collect information on
compliance costs for beneficiaries, or attempt to
account for these in setting benefits.
What about ethical concerns with conditionalities?
All public policy involves important and contentious
ethical issues, and those associated with income
transfers need to be treated with care. This would
require a more extensive treatment than the space
at my disposal permits. I shall restrict myself to
making a non-controversial point. Many countries
have legislation requiring compulsory schooling at
primary, and increasingly at secondary school level.
Most countries have legislation restricting child
labour and many countries have early childhood
interventions which include immunisation of infants.
To the extent that conditionalities apply to these
areas, similar ethical issues arise.
To conclude, people in poverty have deficits which
extend beyond purchasing power and which may cause
the persistence of poverty. It is encouraging that this
perspective on poverty is exerting a strong influence on
new forms of social assistance. Among these,
conditional income transfers require beneficiaries to
invest in schooling, healthcare and nutrition. As with
other design features of income transfers,
conditionalities reflect programme objectives, social
preferences and political factors, and conditionalities
have advantages and limitations, and are context-
specific. A concern with conditionalities is the extent to
which they impose non-trivial compliance costs on
beneficiaries that are not accounted for in setting
benefit levels. Conditionalities can strengthen linkages
between income transfers and access to basic services.
They are likely to be effective, if at all, at the margins.
An understanding of the role of conditionalities in
income transfers, hastily undertaken in this brief note,
helps to put these in perspective.
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* Given space limitations, I have ‘economised’ on
references. Readers interested in more should
contact me at a.barrientos@ids.ac.uk.
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